lunes, 18 de enero de 2010

Shaping a Civilian Surge in Afghanistan

As President Obama prepares to send 30,000 more American troops to Afghanistan this year, a much needed civilian surge, stressed by several analysts and President Obama’s advisers is also underway. According to the Congressional Research Service Report from September 28, 2009, more than 90% of US funds committed to Afghanistan since 2001 have been directed to military and stability operations through the Department of Defense (See table below).


The remaining funds mostly dedicated to development efforts have barely reached the Afghan people with a great share (sources estimate 40%) going back to donor countries to cover contractor overhead and high salaries and living expenses for USNs (United States Nationals) and TCNs (Third Country Nationals). Since USAID funds are channeled through contractors (the five largest being KBR, the Louis Berger Group, Chemonics International, Bearing Point and Dyncorp International in Afghanistan) that absorb these high expenses in their operations, it has become very controversial what the real impact of this aid has been on improving the life of Afghans. This has become an ever so important issue with the emergence of what Killcullen termed “accidental guerillas” who having remained marginalized from the central government and seen mostly the negative effects of the war have become fighters alongside the Taliban attempting to recover their own sense of sovereignty and empowerment.


Thus American strategists have come to the realization that more than counterterrorism tactics, counterinsurgency tactics must be used to bring in under government rule the majority (approx. 90%) of approximately 30,000 so-called Taliban (supporters) who are not really extremists and are liable to change. In light of this knowledge, the US Army has increasingly been shifting its strategy from enemy-centric to population-centric, in other words providing security to the population to ensure their support, as opposed to just targeting the enemy. This fight for the population’s support requires a solid knowledge of the population and a civilian face to accompany the military face- thus the need for a civilian surge. In light of this the following characteristics should be intrinsic in the civilian surge:

1. Invest in Programs that Work: Take the Central Asia Institute founded by Greg Mortenson, for example, which over 16 years has built/supported 130 schools in rural Pakistan and Afghanistan, providing education to more than 30,000 children with annual revenue just a fraction of what the US government is spending every day in Afghanistan.

2. Go outside of Kabul: Most NGOs and international development programs are based in Kabul, while the most vulnerable population (economically, socially and in terms of security) has remained out of reach mostly in the eastern/southern parts of Afghanistan. If the US is to pursue a counter-insurgent (population-centric) strategy it must reach out to this population.

3. Let locals design their programs: Allowing and encouraging the local population to lead and participate in the design of local development programs will increase their sense of ownership, pride and ultimately the sustainability of the program since they will protect with their lives what they have stakes in.


4. Focus on local governance: “All politics are local” in Afghanistan. Historically much of the Pashtun belt has remained out of the reach of the central government leading to a culture of local leaders based on tribal affiliation and later warlordism. Therefore, focusing on gaining the support of and working with local leaders should be a key priority.


5. Bring in cultural experts- A major deficiency in military operations, as defined by American military commanders, has been the lack of knowledge of local customs and language and the huge impact this has on operations. Bringing in cultural and linguistic experts from Afghanistan to work side by side soldiers during military operations can insure that non-lethal/kinetic solutions are used when possible.


6. Focus on women but don’t forget men: A lot of attention has been given to educating and empowering women since the fall of the Taliban regime. It is well known that empowering a woman has huge benefits and effects on improving health and education of their children. Nevertheless, it shouldn’t be forgotten that while a majority of women are illiterate and uneducated, so are men and many of these men are influenced to join the Taliban for diverse reasons. Providing plausible alternatives, mainly economic, to supporting the Taliban should be a key component of the strategy.


7. Use all resources of diplomacy: Reconstructing a country, even with multi-national support-as evidenced in both Iraq and Afghanistan- is no easy affair. In a time of increased multi-lateral diplomacy-advocated by President Obama- the United States should integrate Afghanistan’s neighbors –all of them- in the reconstruction process. By neighbors I mean specifically Iran who also has high stakes in the country, including refugee influx, drug trafficking and general economic relations. In the aftermath of 9/11, Iran provided logistical support to the United States including transportation and translators. During the Bonn Conference in 2001, it was on the recommendation of the Iranian delegation that the word “democracy” and the calling for fighting terrorism by the future Afghan government were introduced. In the Hague Conference last year, Iran’s participation demonstrated once more its willingness to engage positively with Coalition forces in the reconstruction of Afghanistan.

In the next couple months we will probably see the predictable effects of a military surge, including initially, the increase of violence as Taliban forces retaliate. However, in the long-run the establishment of more security forces will surely boost both the real and perceived sense of security in the country. While security is a primary concern in Afghanistan, if it is not paired with focused development and diplomatic efforts led by a civilian surge, then it is not likely to be sustainable as witnessed by a so-far 8 year long war.




Mariam Zan

1 comentario:

  1. That is astonishing that 40% goes back to donor countries. The NGOs need to lwoer their costs and figure out how to do it cheaper.
    It is really astonishing that the US government forgot basically everything that they should have learned from 1979-1992 when we helped the mujhadeen overthrow the soviets. There have been almost no surprises regarding afghanistan. We knew the fragmented and tribal composition of the country. The saddest thing though is that nothing was done to rebuild Afghanistan after that war. We used them and left them behind with barely a thanks. How much cheaper and safer would it have been to do this. If we had helped them form a coalition government maybe 9/11 never happens.

    Focusing on women is very important. Women who run the family budget devote more to education and other nurturing activities.

    Hopefully this time we will actually help them rebuild.

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