In Kapisa, a province recognized by many as the Taliban’s gateway to Kabul, development comes at the expense of counterinsurgency (COIN). In this French battle space, communication is not the main barrier between the French and Americans for the conduct of joint operations; instead the real problem lies in a difference of mindset and capabilities with regards to the conduct of counterinsurgency operations. America is represented in the Province by the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), which has a mindset at odds with the French and the larger NATO command.
PRTs in Afghanistan are a mix of civilian-military entities, led by the military and designed to extend the authority of the Afghan central government, improve security and promote reconstruction. In practice, however, PRTs do not seem to be well equipped to effectively engage the population and conduct counterinsurgency operations. As defined by LTC David Kilcullen, counterinsurgency is the “competition with the insurgents for the right to win the hearts, minds and acquiescence of the population”. An integral part of this effort is to know the human terrain, and understand what drives and motivates the population. For example, while more than 22 million US dollars are being spent on current road projects in one district of Kapisa, the PRT has done little to monitor the societal impact of these projects. There are few to no records since the PRT’s establishment in Kapisa Province, of assessments conducted prior to the implementation of projects or monitoring and evaluation plans measuring the success of projects. These development projects have resulted in significant local population dislocation. Displaced and affected villagers come to the gates of FOB Morales-Frazier frequently and their petitions for compensation go, for the most part, unheard and unattended, the reality being that few want to deal with this issue. In a recent conversation with a district shura member, he stated that it was his belief that more than 80% of the properties along Ghaus Valley had been destroyed by PRT-funded road construction. While this may be an exaggeration, it demonstrates the high degree of frustration that local villagers are experiencing.
The road compensation issue reflects the PRT’s inability to effectively conduct COIN operations. The unintended negative consequences of the Kapisa road construction were first identified in October 2009 and in May 2010, through a combined effort; Civil Affairs (CA) and Human Terrain Team (HTT) developed a framework to assess the status of road compensation. Consequently, road compensation was adopted by the French Task Force in their Campaign Plan and an assessment was completed in July 2010. One of the problems identified in this assessment was that even though villagers are entitled to compensation according to both Afghan Law and the poorly redacted PRT road contracts, neither the contractors nor the PRT have shown much enthusiasm for enforcing the rights of these compensation claims, demonstrating a difference in PRT and French mindset. In light of this, the road compensation issue has remained only partially addressed and mostly unsupported. While PRT Kapisa invests in expensive road projects designed to economically empower the population and increase positive perception of Coalition Forces (CF) and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA)- it is in fact, to a great extent achieving the opposite. In a sense, the business of building roads in Kapisa has become a form of C-COIN (Counter-COIN). Villagers are being displaced under the pretext that the PRT and GIRoA have failed to provide the contractor with a means to give compensation. At the same time, there are reports from various sources that large contract amounts are ending up in Taliban hands. Simultaneously, GIRoA-sponsored shuras like the District Development Assembly (DDA) and Afghanistan Social Outreach Program (ASOP) have stated during meetings that they believe they are losing credibility and legitimacy as representatives of the people and mediators because of their inability to procure compensation. Consequently, and most disturbingly, this tendency towards the support of C-COIN projects by PRT Kapisa has in essence been paving the way for the insurgency. While historically most of the Nijrab District in Kapisa has been generally safe from insurgency, in recent months, the Taliban have begun to exploit discords between villagers and contractors to plant IEDs in historically safe areas, most recently in a contractor’s vehicle in Dehqazi Village, which is at the crossroads of 2 PRT-funded roads.
While PRTs are intended to be an integral part of COIN operations in Afghanistan, there seems to be a mismatch between their capabilities and functions which hinders partnership with Brigades in this regards. Using PRT Kapisa as a case study, this mismatch can be described in 5 points:
One of the main sources of this problem can be traced to the nature of the PRT’s leadership. For success to be realized in this phase of the Afghan COIN push, individuals with ground combat experience are required. Talented individuals have been drawn to service on PRTs throughout Afghanistan, but few of them have combat experience. Technical professionals (often Air Force and Navy field grade officers) have been elevated to decision-making capacities, namely the commander of the PRT, where they are expected to rapidly understand and execute population centric operations. In practice this has not been a reasonable expectation. PRT leadership tours are relatively short. Many of those who have sought out the assignment do not believe in the priority of the COIN mission and those that do, who do not have combat experience, have a steep learning curve. It boils down to this: not everyone is good at counterinsurgency and many people don’t understand the concepts associated with it and as a result can not effectively execute the mission.
In Kapisa, in light of the disconnect between leadership capabilities and expected functions, the main problem that road compensation assessments have faced is the PRT’s lack of commitment to this project at higher levels and thus an unwillingness to direct staff to take on responsibilities and give proper prioritization to this project. This is in contrast to the priority it has been given by the French Task Force. PRTs need commanders with boots-on-the-ground experience. They are in positions that demand experience and talent as opposed to rank. In a COIN environment, rank does not translate to an automatic capability to deal with the ever changing variables when dealing with the human condition, unlike technical fields such as aviation where tightly controlled, detail-focused management is understood as a normal way of conducting operations. The Afghan COIN theatre demands individuals who have the ability to function independently, consequently, the leadership positions could very well be filled by Majors with a combat arms background such as Marine Corps Infantry officers, as opposed to an Air Force or Navy Lieutenant Colonel. Infantry and combat arms officers have experience in dealing with the population and have at least a basic understanding of Civil Military Operations.
A second PRT organizational problem that should be addressed is the downside of mixing the services and agencies within the PRT. On isolated PRTs this practice exacerbates coordination since there is much room for preferential treatment and competing interests. Many are more interested in their personal performance appraisals rather than dealing and coordinating with others. In PRT Kapisa, for example, the lack of coordination and unity of effort has led to road contracts that do not follow the dictates of Afghan Law regarding compensation. Sensibilities are at their highest with civilians and military counterparts competing for contacts and information. While much has been made of and written on the subject of a “combined joint environment” the ground truth is that when it comes to population-centric operations, there is a wide chasm in the cultural make-up of the respective services in how operations are conducted. Keeping branch integrity could mitigate the friction and perception of preferential treatment within the PRT. Furthermore, there need to be more civilians integrated into the PRT structure with longer deployment periods than the military staff. One of their main roles should be to serve as keepers of institutional knowledge and, equally important, to provide the civilian perspective in COIN operations. Communication, coordination and sharing of information should be the norm in PRTs. In addition, information collection and relationship building are of no use unless they are applied. “Banking” them does not earn dividends. So a careful balance needs to be struck between withholding information and security. In order to truly comprehend the population, members of the PRT need to be given more leeway to embed with the population. A tight grip on transportation regulations such as what type of vehicle one can travel in or the use of the helmet during population engagements may serve as somewhat preventative measures, but have the potential to greatly undermine COIN operations and create further distance between CF and the local population. Such is the case in PRT Kapisa, where the conduct of joint French-PRT operations has not been possible to date given transportation restrictions on Americans. Furthermore, inadequate manpower and interest within the PRT has led to superficial engagements with limited time to build relationships (ie. tea diplomacy).
Third, the PRT staffs come into theater with poor training and limited social interaction skills. Many believe that they have no role in dealing with the local population except within the narrow confines of what their contract calls for on technical issues. One PRT Civil Engineer simply put it this way: “I hate people and I don’t want to deal with Afghans”. Therefore the bulk of local interaction especially with regards to road compensation issues falls on the Civil Affairs Team which has limited manpower to conduct these operations. While the State Department and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) representatives are expected to also engage the population, coordination with these entities becomes unviable given the limited manpower for a whole province and frequent leave times (3 vacations a year), by military standards, with no one to replace these representatives. Afghanistan is a COIN operation; however at PRT Kapisa the bulk of the population engagement is often left to 1-3 man Civil Affairs elements covering 2-3 districts. In sum, the PRT is a team with a very shallow “bench” of personal whose primary role is to engage the population and an even slimmer pool of capable individuals. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that there are frequent disasters involving PRT representatives engaging in uninformed conversations with locals during shuras.
The HTT in Kapisa, in conjunction with TFLF PSYOPS, developed a practical data collection toolkit for small units titled “Understanding Local People in Afghanistan”. While the French Brigade has adopted this methodology, the PRT has yet to mandate uniform practices at its lowest levels. If the PRT is to conduct COIN in Afghanistan, then they need to be trained to conduct it. Due in great part to deficient training and coordination, high level members of PRT Kapisa engage in uninformed conversations with locals regularly. It can be challenging to interact with people from a different culture and those that are naturally talented at this should be put into a position where they can best succeed and positively affect the mission. Once again, talent and abilities should supersede rank. All those deployed should be required to take a cultural sensitivity training course before getting into theater and refresher courses while deployed. A PRT commander in a shura is as liable to making a cultural sensitivity error negatively affecting the mission as is the guard at the FOB gate. Therefore, training needs to reach all levels of the PRT.
Fourth, there seems to be no standardization in how development funds are allocated by PRTs. A look at where PRT Kapisa has focused its development projects shows a clear concentration on the southern and northern districts of Kapisa. The main development projects implemented in Nijrab District (central Kapisa) are 6 road projects and a weakly managed strong foods program (nutritional supplements provided to malnourished children). Given the lack of other projects, most of the population’s perceptions of GIRoA and CF have been shaped by the effects of the road construction to include property damage. No quick impact or cash for work projects have been implemented in this district. After an analysis of the allocation of quick impact projects throughout Kapisa it seems that these have been sprinkled in different areas without a particular pattern or strategy. Developing frameworks, assessments and strategies prior to implementing projects are time consuming things. PRT staff performance appraisals appear to be based on amounts spent. It seems logical that they see no sense in assessing the true impact of projects. Yet assessing real progress is a key to achieving sustained development and necessary element in a framework that aims at achieving transparency. The international community decries GIRoA’s lack of transparency, but when a NATO PRT shirks its responsibility in this regard, what leg does it have to stand on to be critical of GIRoA?
Instead of putting resources into developing a transparent accounting tool for its existing construction projects, funds are being pumped into short-term non-sustainable projects in areas where we are unable to monitor the quality but yet somehow believe it will have a positive effect on hearts and minds has become the norm. In Southern Kapisa, for example, the PRT has engaged in a spending drive in what is described as Cash for Work (CFW) projects in villages along the Main Supply Route (MSR). The idea is to provide employment to military-aged males as an alternative income to joining the insurgency. Upon closer inspection, however, there are several issues with this plan. First, there is no strategy for the selection of these villages. In other words, no study has been undertaken as to the measure of strategic value of the villages in question and how it relates to the mission. This scheme also over-emphasizes the effect that these “low cost” projects would deliver to the battle space in terms of the three lines of operation: governance, security and development. Since this project only provides up to 30 days of employment for each village, it is not sustainable and does nothing for either building capacity or giving credibility to leaders at the local level. Lastly, there is no mechanism in place to measure the impact of this allocation of funds; therefore, in the end the PRT is engaged in spending money for the sake of spending without a clear idea of what the effect of this will be. Dealing with the road compensation issue demands an assessment of property damage and the establishment of measures of performance. Given that sound planning is not a common practice in the PRT, road compensation continues to be a marginalized topic, too much of a hassle to deal with because it would suggest a complete overhaul of current practices.
It should be common practice, similar to USAID contracts, that before funds are approved a well thought-out strategy and monitoring & evaluation plan should be developed. At the end of the day those in positions of authority have a fiduciary responsibility to the US taxpayer. Without a way to measure the success of a project, the PRT is in essence spending money with no results.
A fifth detail to be considered is one of the PRTs key methods of communicating with the local population: the interpreter. In-depth language training should come a close second to COIN experience for the PRT leadership. But when that is not available interpreters must be relied on. A good interpreter, competent and trained, provides accurate information. However, an untrained interpreter impedes the understanding of the local population and undermines COIN operations. Unfortunately, the pool of interpreters for PRTs in Afghanistan is mostly limited to two types of groups: 1. Aged Afghan/American Citizens who are out of touch with current realities in Afghanistan, have poor English skills, and who have little enthusiasm for field work, though that is what they were hired for; and 2. Young and inexperienced Afghans with an unclear understanding of what their role really is and with ulterior motives. Neither one of these groups provides the ideal expertise, when trying to build relationships with the population. Furthermore, since few members of PRT Kapisa actually engage the population, these interpreters continue to be inexperienced and become accustomed to not dealing with the local population. Once again a balance needs to be struck in this area to invest in recruitment of highly skilled and motivated native speakers with a solid understanding of Afghan socio-political, cultural and economic issues, who may not necessarily be an American Citizen with a security clearance. Furthermore, part of the burden should fall on the PRT to, upon arrival; provide training to the interpreters to include a clear understanding of expectations and how performance will be measured. Unless there are incentives for good performance, translations and interpretations will not be of high standards. In the road compensation issue interpreters have not always been sensitive to the complaints of the locals to the point of interrupting them or even yelling at them. These are actions that need to be monitored and corrected. Furthermore unless there is a means of measuring accuracy of translation, like another native speaker present or a voice recorder, translations are not always of the best quality and undermine the true spirit of what is being said.
Given the mismatch in functions and capabilities as demonstrated in the PRT Kapisa case study, it is no wonder that most PRTs in Afghanistan have been marginally successful in conducting COIN operations that deal with the root of grievances like property damage caused by road construction. While the idea of PRTs in Afghanistan may seem appealing, in practice they do not have the appropriate and sufficient human capital or resources conducive to conducting full-scale COIN operations. In this environment, with these constraints, it is difficult to affect change at the local level and invest in sustainable programs positively affecting operations. Instead, we continue to spend many billions of dollars on roads in Afghanistan without winning hearts and minds, and then we wonder why we continue to struggle in establishing an enduring and sustainable development environment.
SFC Frank Lugo
Mr. David Holbrook
Mariam Zan
This year I was marked by the presence of several people, but there is one particular person that had the greatest effect on me: my best friend in Afghanistan, Frank. During a period of 6 months, Frank and I endured each other, in what could only be described as a love-hate relationship. It is nevertheless with certainty that I can say that this friendship is one of the best I have ever had. Some moments I will never forget include: 1) the night we met which was also our first argument, 2) when we presented each other our ideas and consequently partnered in the greatest two initiatives we would undertake while in Afghanistan, 3) the several missions we planned and executed together, to include with the French, 4) late nights writing strategies and papers, 5) cooking the HTT barbeque, 6) movie nights to include Weeds, Spartacus and Lie to Me, and 7) the numerous times we stood up for each other even though we frequently argued with each other. Our paths became so intertwined that the reasons we ultimately parted Afghanistan could be traced to the same source: our common stubbornness and emotional attachment to the mission. 
