Gaddafi’s double standard justice

COL Gaddafi’s gruesome and unsurprising death given the repressive nature of his regime, may serve as a warning to autocratic rulers around the world, but it also casts a dark shadow in the conduct of international relations and application of international humanitarian law. NATO’s success in Libya has empowered the United Nations as a legitimate force of international law and seems to indicate a greater move towards liberal democracies in the Arab world.  Nevertheless, the inhumane treatment of the former dictator as well as the double standards observed in Western leaders’ relations with Gaddafi begs an evaluation of to what extent justice has really been served in Libya. 

Gaddafi’s Early Regime

The relationship between the West and Gaddafi, the longest ruling leader in the Arab world and Africa, was marked by several ups and downs after he came into power through a bloodless coup.  It was more as a result of Gaddafi’s support for international terrorism and nationalist economic policies, as opposed to his politically repressive regime, however, that Libya was increasingly isolated.

Escalation with Libya reached a peak following the 1986 bombing of the Berlin nightclub. In an arguably premature and disproportionate retaliation, the Reagan administration, which had branded Gaddafi “the mad dog of the Middle East” ordered strikes against Tripoli and Benghazi causing extensive damage and killing, among others, Gaddafi’s adopted daughter.  

A Partnership with the West

Less than a decade after UN sanctions against Libya, Gaddafi made dramatic foreign policy changes bringing him closer to the West. He delivered the Lockerbie suspects for trial and in 2003 announced the abandonment of his WMD program and paid compensation to the families of Pam Am Flight 103 and UTA Flight 772. The decade prior to the Arab Spring, Gaddafi resumed diplomatic and economic relations with the West and became a partner against terrorism. Through cooperation between the CIA, MI6 and Libyan intelligence service, several terrorist suspects were interrogated in Libya.

The Dual Libyan Model

         Libya’s partnership with western powers after 2003 was regarded as a model of what could be achieved through negotiation rather than force.  Nevertheless, the “Arab Spring” turned the tide against the use of diplomatic approaches. The mediation plan put forward by Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez was rejected by the US, several European countries and Libyan rebels, who preferred instead Gaddafi’s resignation or a military strategy. Would this proposal have been taken more seriously had it been put forward by a permanent Security Council member? Probably, but it is just as likely that Western leaders had grown tired of Gaddafi and were eager to see some kind of strategic change in Libya.

The adoption of UNSCR 1973 in March 17, 2011, formed a legal basis for military intervention to protect civilians from government violence. The NATO intervention, however, empowered the armed rebels while ignoring the human atrocities they too, as subjects of international law may commit. Germany was one of the countries to remain neutral on the resolution foreseeing serious risks and no doubt adding to its credibility as a trusted middleman for negotiations in the Islamic world. At the beginning of the intervention, Gaddafi’s letter to Obama “Our Dear Son, Excellency, Baraka Hussein Abu Oumama” denoted the close relationship he had felt to western powers. In addition to asking Obama to halt NATO intervention, he diplomatically pointed to America’s double standard in interventions and questioned America’s role as a “world police”.

The coordinated international mobilization of lethal force in Libya may present a second “Libyan model” to replicate elsewhere.  However, politics will continue to determine interventions and it remains to be seen what the global political will is for “humanitarian interventions” in other countries such as Syria and Iran or even Mexico. In an interview with CNN in November 2011, the Russian Ambassador to the UN pointed to the double standards in dealing with Yemen and Bahrain and questioned the role of the international community.  He also observed that intervention in Libya was intended to “protect civilians” but instead caused large amounts of casualties.

The Devil We Don’t Know

While Gaddafi may have reaped what he sowed in Libya, his death after his capture marks an undemocratic beginning for a country trying to move away from Gaddafi’s brutal tactics. The public display of his decomposing body in a Misrata meat locker for several days leaves many western backers uneasy.  Furthermore, now that Gaddafi is considered a martyr by loyalists, retribution between loyalists and rebels will continue so long as Libya is still awash with guns.

Gaddafi’s Ghost

President Obama’s foreign policy during the Libya intervention was mixed with idealism and realism. While his decision to intervene was likely driven by logic of appropriateness and a fear of being judged a moral failure, he still recognized that Libya was more of a vital interest to Europe and took a secondary role supporting the creation of pragmatic alliances. Even in this role, however, the US provided a substantial amount of aid, begging the question if Europeans would still have intervened in Libya without US support. Statements by Tory MP arguing that Libya should pay British intervention since NATO has helped free its economy undermine the humanitarian aspect of the intervention.  Could it be, as some leaked diplomatic cables seem to reveal, that western countries have backed the intervention with key benefits in mind to install a regime better serving their political and economic interests?

What remains clear is that while Gaddafi may be dead, the system he created is still alive. Libya was officially declared “liberated” on October 23, 2011, but it faces several challenges in reestablishing security, revitalizing the economy, rebuilding infrastructure, and building electoral bodies. But could the toppling of Gaddafi’s regime have occurred differently? Given Gaddafi’s admonition that he would fight till the end, the answer seems to be no.  The aim of the NATO forces, nevertheless, fell short of ensuring that rebels too respected international humanitarian law.  Reports of Gaddafi’s extra judicial killing demand an investigation to determine if Geneva Conventions were violated.  The victims under Gaddafi were robbed of justice from having him tried under a Libyan court or International Criminal Court. Instead, Gaddafi, according to speculations, faced an end similar to that of many of his victims, thus blurring the lines between the Gaddafi regime and the one to come.

The question now that Gaddafi has been removed is who will rule Libya and will NATO intervention prove to have been a worthwhile “humanitarian” endeavor? While the official statements of most leaders have been praise for the Libyan people and promised support for the buildup of strong institutions, one can only hope that Libya will indeed meet these expectations. In the aftermath of Gaddafi’s death, Austrian’s Foreign Minister Spindelegger stated that “Although it is never appropriate to feel pleasure about the death of a person, what prevails is a feeling of relief, for now the bloodshed has finally come to an end”. It will remain to be seen, however, if this is the case. As Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated, despite huge amounts of international aid destined to “institution building”, Libya faces an upward slope.

Mariam Zan